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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.
RANDALL EDWARD KOTZ,

Case No. 860269-CA
Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of Case and Statement of Facts are set forth
previously in Appellant's Brief at 1-3.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A failure to review this issue would result in manifest
injustice.

While defense counsel did not object on the record, she

registered her objection to the instruction in chambers.
Defense counsel did not waive the requirement that she be
provided with a written copy of the instruction the court intended
to give.

The facts show no waiver and waiver cannot be presumed

from a silent record.

Nor did defense counsel stipulate to the

instruction; a stipulation requires a written agreement or an oral
statement on the record, neither of which occurred in this case.
The Court should reject the use of supplemental
instructions since the use of such instructions violates due process
and the right to fair trial by an impartial jury under both the Utah

and United States Constitutions.
such instructions.

Utah has never approved the use of

While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has

cautiously approved the use of such instructions, it has suggested
that they be given only in the original set of instructions and not
after the jury has begun deliberations.

In addition, the

instruction itself was coercive.
Finally, this Court is in a position to proscribe the use
of supplemental instructions.

The abridgement of rights under the

Utah Constitution was implicit in Mr. Kotz's argument in the opening
brief.

In addition the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah case

law allow review of this issue.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A FAILURE TO REVIEW THIS ISSUE WOULD RESULT IN
MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL REGISTERED HER OBJECTIONS IN
CHAMBERS.
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IA AT 6)
A realistic approach to reviewing errors at trial requires
a recognition that in the midst of numerous concerns during a trial,
an attorney will occasionally forget to place on the record an
objection made in chambers.

The ability of this Court to review an

error so as to avoid manifest injustice arises out of a recognition
that trial lawyers, focusing on a myriad of issues and concerns, are
not always perfect in repeating arguments on the record which have
already made to the trial court in chambers.
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In the present case, the record at trial is silent as to
any discussions regarding the supplemental instruction.

However,

the record from the motion for new trial hearing establishes that an
in chambers discussion regarding the appropriateness of the
instruction occurred (R. 82). The recollection of defense counsel
was that she asked to see a written instruction, and that she had
some concerns about the propriety of a supplemental instruction and
needed to do research or call other lawyers in order to backup her
concerns with case law (R. 82-84, R. 87, 89).
The prosecutor did not "recall anything I specifically
disagree with as recited by defense counsel" (R. 86). The court
stated "Well, my memory is not the best on what took place.
too many of them."

I have

(R. 90). The Court did recall a discussion as

to whether to proceed orally or in writing, and that defense
counsel, the prosecutor and the Court all had some concerns on this
point (R. 90).
The court thought he indicated what he planned to say to
the jury, but believed he may have summarized rather than given a
verbatim discussion.

(R. 90). The Court's recollection was that

both counsel were in agreement as to how to proceed, however, the
recollections of defense counsel and the prosecutor indicated
otherwise since both acknowledged that defense counsel had some
concerns about the instructions and made phone calls after the inchambers discussion to reach someone familiar with the law regarding
supplemental instructions. (R. 87,89)
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In this case, defense counsel voiced her objection in
chambers and thereafter failed to place the objection on the record,
but immediately filed a motion for new trial.

A failure to review

the issue, where the jury was pressured into reaching a decision,
would result in manifest injustice.

B. THE EXTEMPORANEOUS DELIVERY VIOLATED RULE 19(a)
SINCE DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE REQUIREMENT FOR WRITTEN
INSTRUCTION NOR STIPULATE TO ORAL INSTRUCTION.
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT IB AT 7)
The State acknowledges "(t)he relative advantages of
instructing the jury from a written text."

Respondents Brief at 8.

However, the State suggests that "it appears that both sides
stipulated to the supplemental instruction's extemporaneous delivery
during the discussion in chambers."

Respondent's Brief at 8.

The

trial judge acknowledged that he did not have a very good memory of
the proceedings, but thought both parties had agreed to the
procedure ultimately followed.

He did recall a discussion as to

whether to proceed orally or in writing (R. 90).
Defense counsel, however, recalled asking the court about a
written instruction (R. 86). The prosecutor did not refer to any
stipulation, but instead stated "that the Court proferred what it
would be telling the jury, and told defense counsel that if the jury
still could not reach a decision, she could submit an instruction"
(R. 57). The recollections taken together, do not suggest that
counsel waived the right to a written instruction or stipulated to
such.

- 4
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Waiver of a constitutional right cannot be presumed from a
silent record.

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 8 L.Ed. 2d 70, 82

S.Ct. 884 (1962).
1986).

See also State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah

While the specific right to review a written instruction in

and of itself is not constitutionally mandated, the resulting
deprivation of due process, fair trial and trial by an impartial
jury requires that waiver not be presumed in this case.

When the

resistance to presume waiver is coupled with the factual context as
clarified at the new trial hearing that defense counsel expressed
concerns about the instructions and specifically asked about a
written instruction, waiver cannot be presumed.
Moreover, a stipulation requires affirmative action from
both parties, it cannot be presumed from a silent record.

Rule

4.5(b) of the Rules of Practice for District Courts provides that
stipulations must be in writing or made orally in open court.
Hence, no waiver of the right to review a written instruction nor
stipulation that the oral instruction be given to the jury occurred
in this case.

C. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE USE OF
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS.
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT IC1 AT 13)
The use of supplemental instructions after the jury has
begun its deliberations violates a defendant's right to trial by an
impartial jury as guaranteed by Article I, §12 of the Utah
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Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and to due process and a fair trial as
guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

In

addition, the use of such instructions abridges the dictates of Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-17(c) (1953 as amended) requiring all felonies
tried by a jury unless waived and Utah Code Ann. §76-35-17(1) and
(m) (1953 as amended) which provide for the jury to reach the
ultimate decision without being interfered with.J-

!•

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17(1) and (m) (1953 as amended) provide:
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the
jury, they shall be kept together in some
convenient place under charge of an officer until
they agree upon a verdict or are discharged,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by
order of the court, the officer having them under
his charge shall not allow any communication to
be made to them, or make any himself, except to
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict,
and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered,
communicate to any person the state of their
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for
deliberation, if they desire to be informed on
any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall
communicate such request to the court. The court
may then direct that the jury be brought before
the court where, in the presence of the defendant
and both counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further
instructions shall be given. Such response shall
be recorded. The court may in its discretion
respond to the inquiry in writing without having
the jury brought before the court, in which case
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be
entered in the record.
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The State argues that no manifest injustice occurred in
this case since the use of supplemental instructions has been
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) and by .the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and has "never [been] disapproved or even criticized by a
Utah appellate court" (Respondent's Brief at 14). While the State
is correct that Utah has not disapproved the use of supplemental
instructions, neither has it approved such practice.

The only

comment on the subject in Utah case law is the footnote in State v.
Medina, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 n.l referred to by both the State
and Mr. Kotz (Respondent's Brief at 13, 14 and Appellant's Brief at
4, 12, 14, 15) wherein the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the
concern which exists over such instructions.
The State is also correct that the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has "cautiously" approved such instructions.

However, that

court has clarified that the trial judge must exercise caution in
the use of such instructions so as not to coerce the jury and has
"call[ed] attention to the inherent danger in this type of
instruction."

United States v. Wynn, 415 F.2d 135, 137 (1965).

In

addition, the Tenth Circuit has "repeatedly suggested that the
substance of this charge should be included in the original
instructions," and in United States v. Wynn, supra, "reiterate(d)
the suggestion that, if it is given at all, it be incorporated in
the body of the original instructions."

The Wynn Court made this

"suggestion, confident it will be heeded in the conduct of future
jury trials."

Id.
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In United States v. Blandin, 784 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.
1986), cited by the State in Respondent's Brief at 13,17, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals permitted the use of an Allen instruction
which was given in the Court's original instructions to the jury.
In Blandin, the Tenth Circuit again admonished that

fl

(i)f the Allen

instruction is given at all, it should be incorporated into the body
of the court's original instructions to the jury.
given during the course of deliberations.

It should not be

United States v. Blandin,

supra at 1050 (emphasis added).
Moreover, various other jurisdictions have disapproved the
use of supplemental instructions.

See Brief of Appellant at 4-8;

See also, An argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in
California (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law 939.

The use of a supplemental

instruction after the jury has begun deliberations has not been
approved on appeal in Utah; nor is it acceptable to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.

In light of the coercive nature of such

instructions and the interference with the jury's deliberations, Mr.
Kotz respectfully requests that the use not be approved in this
case.
D.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS COERCIVE.
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT IC2 AT 18)

The State also argues that the instruction itself was not
coercive.

As outlined in Mr. Kotz' opening brief, the judge

informed the jury that they had enough evidence to reach a decision,
told them juries make these types of decisions daily, and chastised
them for avoiding a hard decision (R. 340). Implicit in the judge's
statements is a demand that the jury reach a verdict and a
- 8 -

suggestion that a juror who stuck to his guns and thereby prevented
the jury from reaching a decision would displease the judge.
The State contends that the time spent deliberating after
the instruction was given suggests that the supplemental instruction
had little impact on the jury.

On the contrary, the lengthy

continued deliberations suggest more strongly that the jury had
reached an impasse and that a hold out juror ultimately let go of
his position not because he believed Mr. Kotz was guilty, but
because the judge coerced the jury into reaching a decision.

POINT II
THIS COURT IS IN A POSITION TO PROSCRIBE THE USE OF
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AFTER THE JURY HAS BEGUN
DELIBERATIONS.
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT II AT 21)
In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the United
States Supreme Court found that there was no error in the giving of
a supplemental instruction.

In that case, Appellant filed no brief

and the Court reached its decision without benefit of an analysis by
Appellant as to why such an instruction would be error.

The Allen

Court did not analyze the giving of the instruction in terms of due
process or concerns over the right to trial by jury.

Nor did it

analyze the instruction under the rules of criminal procedure; it
simply stated that no error occurred.
In asking this Court to disregard Allen, Mr. Kotz outlined
cases from other jurisdictions where the use of supplemental
instructions has been rejected.

While not specifically stating that

the right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Article I,
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§12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, or the right to due process and a fair trial,
as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
the position that such rights were compromised was implicit in Mr,
Kotz1 legal analysis regarding the continued propriety of such
instructions.
Just as the Allen court did not outline the basis of its
decision, the Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d
197 (Ariz. 1959), relied upon in Appellant's opening brief at 5, 9,
did not specifically state the basis of its decision that the use of
supplemental instructions would no longer be tolerated in Arizona.
While the California Supreme Court briefly noted in People v.
Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Ca. 1977) that the right to a fair trial and
trial by jury guaranteed by the California Constitution were
compromised by the use of supplemental instructions, the bulk of the
opinion focused on the coercive nature of such instructions and the
error in their continued use.
The Gainer and Thomas decisions indicate that the rights to
due process, fair trial and trial by an impartial jury are infringed
upon by the use of supplemental instructions.

The State focused on

the issue of the continued propriety of such instructions in its
brief, and was adequately informed, based on the Appellant's opening
brief and its own response that the propriety of the use of
supplemental instructions under the Utah Constitution was at issue
in this case.

- 10 ~

In addition, in Romrell v. Zion's First National Bank,
N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court determined
that it may, in its discretion, decide a case on "any points that
its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply
brief" Ijd.

at 395.

If this court determines that the argument that

rights to due process and trial by impartial jury guaranteed by the
Utah Constitution were violated was not adequately advanced in the
opening brief due to a failure to specifically cite the appropriate
provisions, this Court may nevertheless address the issue if, in its
discretion, it determines that the issue is important to the proper
disposition of this case. As argued in Appellant's opening brief,
the continued use of such instructions and the constitutionality
thereof, is a key issue in this case.
The State further argues that this Court is not empowered
to adopt new rules for trial courts. Regardless of this Court's
position on the interpretation of Article VIII §4 of the Utah
Constitution, Mr. Kotz is not asking this Court to formulate new
rules of procedure.

Instead, Mr. Kotz is asking this Court to

consider the existing rules of Criminal Procedure, in particular
Utah Code Ann.§77-35-17(c) (1953 as amended) requiring all felonies
to be tried by jury unless otherwise waived and Utah Code Ann.
§76-35-17(1) and (m) (1953 as amended) and determine that those
rules, read in conjunction with the Utah Constitution, require that
this Court reject the use of supplemental instructions after the
jury has begun deliberations.
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasonsf the Appellant,
Randall Edward Kotz, seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of
his case to the District Court with an order for either a new trial
or dismissal of the charges.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1987.

DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for Appellant
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JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, DEBRA K. LOY, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorney for Appellant
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